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UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM OR DINOSAUR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE 
LANGUAGE OF STATES RIGHTS’  
di  Anne Richardson Oakes** & Ilaria Di Gioia*** 
 
his paper is a reflection on the nature of state opposition to the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) (2010) popularly known as the Affordable Care 
Act or simply Obamacare. The Act, signed into force by President Obama on 
March 23, 2010, represented the most significant regulatory overhaul of the U.S. healthcare 
system since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 but a multi-state constitutional 
challenge to the individual mandate and the expansion of Medicaid began only minutes 
after the President signed the Act into force.1 By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court, twenty–six states and their Attorneys-General and/or Governors had joined two 
private citizens and the NFIB in a suit which, per Florida Senior District Judge Vinson was 
“not really about our health care system at all. It is principally about our federalist system, 
and it raises very important issues regarding the Constitutional role of the federal 
government.”2   
In the event, the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius3 upheld the Act’s 
individual mandate provision. However the Court struck down the companion provisions 
requiring states to expand Medicaid coverage up to 133% (effectively 138%) of the federal 
                                                          
* Contributo sottoposto a double blind peer review. 
** Ph.D.; Director, Center for American Legal Studies, Birmingham City University Law School, Birmingham, UK. 
*** Ph D. candidate, Lecturer, Center for American Legal Studies, Birmingham City University Law School, 
Birmingham, UK. 
1 See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 (2011) (filed by 
Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum in the Northern District of Florida, and joined initially by Idaho Attorney 
General Lawrence Wasden and Utah Attorney General Shurtleff plus eleven other attorneys general. On the same day 
Virginia Attorney General Kenneth Cuccinelli filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia challenging the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of the ACA: Commonwealth v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-CV-00188-HEH 
(E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010). 
2 Id. at 1263.  
3 567 U.S. _ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 2566; figures for between 2011 & 14 are 47 states and 458 bills 
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poverty level on the grounds that they were unconstitutionally coercive. The Act imposed 
a penalty on states that refused to comply with the expansion of Medicaid in the form of 
forfeiture of all existing Medicaid funding but Congress, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, “has 
no authority to order the States to regulate according to its instructions. Congress may offer 
the States grants and require the States to comply with accompanying conditions, but the 
States must have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer.”4 
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius5 and the cases that have 
followed,6 have received considerable attention; less widely appreciated is the extent and 
nature of state legislative activity by which state legislatures have sought to push back 
against the Act and protect their citizens and state officials from forced compliance with its 
provisions. Between 2010 and early 2016, 22 state legislatures have enacted laws and 
measures challenging or opting out of broad health reforms related to mandatory provisions 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).7 Along the line considerably 
more measures have been considered but most have fallen by the wayside, chiefly because 
they used terminology associated with the states’ rights doctrines of nullification, 
intercession and secession, and not heard since the Massive Resistance of Southern states 
that followed the U.S. Supreme Court desegregation mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.8 
State legislators have drawn inspiration from model bills provided by two main sources: 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)9 and the Tenth Amendment Center 
(TAC). Both these organisations promote state opposition to the ACA with justificatory 
arguments referencing the Tenth Amendment and doctrines of states’ rights but their 
rhetoric and the wording of these bills are significantly different, and moreover have 
changed significantly over a six year period. In part this is due to the outcomes of the legal 
challenges to the ACA that they have helped to ground and shape. Both now advocate state 
non-cooperation with the federal government but TAC continues to use the language of 
                                                          
4 Id. at 2608. The decision was highly fractured; leaving scope to question whether Roberts’ view that states must be 
given the right to opt out without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding constitutes the holding of the court; given 
that it only attracted three justices (Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, J.J.) An additional four justices (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, J.J.) objected to the entire Medicaid provision in dissent but did not join Roberts's opinion). For a 
discussion of the breakdown of the voting see Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV.1 (2013). 
5 National Fed’n Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
6 On June 25, 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court voted 6-3 to uphold health insurance subsidies for people who purchased 
their insurance through a federal health insurance exchange.The ruling in King v. Burwell means that 6 million to 7 
million people will continue to receive insurance subsidies 
7 MT, ID, WY, ND UT AZ KS OK TX, MO, AR. LA, IN,TN,AL, OH, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, NH. See figures and 
maps available at NCSL website: http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-actions-challenging-
ppaca.aspx#ND_2011law. 
8 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) held that segregation itself violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; the desegregation mandate came a year later in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294(1955) (Brown II). 
9 ALEC is a not for profit with funding largely from corporations like Exxon Mobil, corporate foundations such as 
the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, or trade associations like the pharmaceutical industry's PhRMA. See 
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/07/10887/cmd-special-report-alecs-funding-and-spending. 
“Since the TAC is not registered as a nonprofit, little information is available about its finances, but it appears to 
function primarily as an internet-based organization with affiliates in most states”- See Rachel Tabachnick, Nullification, 
Neo-Confederates, and the Revenge of the Old Right http://www.politicalresearch.org/tag/tenth-amendment-
center/#sthash.vqbYH2bs.dpuf,  Nov.22, 2013. 
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nullification and it is the nuances of the underlying philosophy that this paper now seeks to 
pick up.10  
Academic commentary on the phenomenon has been divided. Some scholars describe a 
revival of constitutional arguments thought to be long dead as ‘zombie’ or ‘dinosaur’ 
constitutionalism, in effect dead in the water before they are made.11 Others, notably 
respected constitutional commentator Sanford Levinson, take a more pragmatic or, as 
Levinson terms it, functionalist view; the language used may be old but the political 
problems they confront relate directly to twenty-first century workings of U.S. federalism 
and to that extent they are contemporary and new.12 The question remains however: can 
political arguments couched in terms of states’ rights, particularly those which invoke the 
rhetoric of Calhoun and the history of Massive Resistance, shake off the connection with 
the history of race in the United States? 
Interviewed in fall 2014 by journalist and political commentator David Remnick, President 
Obama made just this point. Some conservatives, he conceded, might genuinely consider 
that the federal government was too powerful, too distant and too bureaucratic and that as 
a consequence, there should be a rebalancing of power in favour of the states. Nevertheless, 
he observed, there is a “philosophy wrapped up in the history of states’ rights in the context 
of the civil-rights movement and the Civil War and Calhoun”:  
 
There’s a pretty long history there. ... ... I think it’s important for conservatives 
to recognize and answer some of the problems that are posed by that history...13 
 
Taking this observation as a starting point, this paper compares the language of PPACA 
oppositional bills with that of the Massive Resistance resolutions to consider first the extent 
to which states have learned from the lessons of the past to develop more successful 
strategies for challenging the unwanted reach of federal regulation and secondly how we 
might evaluate these strategies in terms of their contribution to the dynamics of 
contemporary U.S. federalism. 
We begin with a brief overview of state legislative oppositional measures. According to 
the NCSL Affordable Care Act Legislative Database, the 22 state laws and measures related 
to challenging or opting out of broad health reform including the PPACA follow a number 
of general approaches but the legal language varies from state to state and includes statutes 
                                                          
10 http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/. 
11 See Sean Wilentz, States of Anarchy: America’s Long, Sordid Affair with Nullification, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 30, 2010, 
available at http:// www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-essence-anarchy. See also Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify 
Health Care Reform?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 869, 869 (2010) (asserting that recent state measures challenging 
federal health-care legislation “are pure political theater” in pursuit of a goal that “is constitutionally impossible.” ). 
12 Sandford Levinson, The 21st Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (Sandford Levinson ed., 2016). See also John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions 
of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of American Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637 (2011). 
13 Barack Obama, cited by David Remnick Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack Obama, NEW YORKER, Jan 
27, 2014, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-david-remnick. 
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and constitutional amendments, as well as binding and non-binding state resolutions.14 The 
site identifies broad approaches with individual state measures typically incorporating at 
least three. Thus, nine state legislatures have adopted non-binding resolutions or memorials 
to the federal government. Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, Utah and Wyoming have laws restricting further compliance 
with PPACA without state legislative approval. Eighteen states provide that state 
government will not implement or enforce mandates requiring the purchase of insurance 
by individuals or payments by employers and bar state agencies and employees from 
enforcing fines and penalties. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas Missouri, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Utah and Texas have enacted laws authorising entry into interstate health 
compacts, aimed at giving a group of states primary responsibility for regulating health care 
goods and services within their boundaries (except military). Most of the measures also 
include this provision: “Each Member State… may suspend by legislation the operation of 
all federal laws, rules, regulations, and orders regarding Health Care that are inconsistent 
with the laws” adopted by the member state as part of a compact. The creation of any 
interstate compact is not binding without congressional approval, so far untested in relation 
to health, and will not of itself operate to block PPACA implementation; 15 the aim is the 
expressive one of asserting primary responsibility for an important area of regulation 
traditionally regarded as within the power of the state. 
Additional oppositional state legislative measures include the non-expansion of Medicaid, 
non-participation in the health exchange or marketplace provisions, including regulating 
and/or restricting the functions of navigators and others who assist consumers in selecting 
health insurance in exchanges or Marketplaces (more than a dozen states have enacted laws 
of this kind) and blocking individual health benefits, most notably contraception. However, 
the nuclear option and the focus of this paper is the bill of nullification.  
Some context is in order. Nullification bills properly so-called take as their starting point 
the alleged unconstitutionality of a federal bill/measure; the state legislature believes that a 
measure is unconstitutional and approves a bill to nullify its effects within its borders. The 
term is often combined with that of interposition and both claim to derive from the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 & 99 drafted by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
respectively in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts enacted as a wartime measure by a 
Federalist Congress and signed into law by President Adams.16  
A detailed discussion of the detail of what Tenth Amendment Center and nullification 
proponent Thomas W. Woods calls ‘the Principles of 98’ is beyond the present scope of 
                                                          
14 The database for bills considered between 2011- 2013 is available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-
reform-database-2011-2013-state-legislation.aspx. The database for bills considered in 2014 is available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/new-health-reform-database.aspx.  
15 Utah repealed most of its compact statute in 2014.  
16  Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798 & Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in 5 The Founders’ 
Constitution 131-35 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions]; 
James Madison, Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien and Sedition Acts (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in JAMES 
MADISON, WRITINGS 589-91 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter Madison, Virginia Resolutions].  
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this paper.17 Briefly, we can observe that nullification and interposition, though often 
combined, are in fact different. Nullification represents the idea that a state can declare a 
federal law which it regards as unconstitutional to be null and void within its borders. 
Interposition asserts the right of the state to interpose its own authority between its citizens 
and unconstitutional laws and to seek the support of other states in so doing.18 However, 
typically in the discourse of Calhoun and contemporary advocates the term interposition is 
used interchangeably with nullification.19 Underpinning both is a theory of state sovereignty 
as a counter-balance to the power of the federal government and an explanation of the U.S. 
constitutional framework which sees the relationship between the states and the federal 
government in terms of a compact or contract. Compact theory offers more than a 
historical understanding of what the union is and where it came from; compacts have terms 
of engagement, providing parameters by which state grievances can be articulated and 
correspondingly rectified. The significance was picked up by John Calhoun and deployed 
initially in opposition to the 1828 tariff statutes which threatened to ruin the cotton-based 
economy of the South and subsequently in justification of full-blown secession.20 The 
South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification was enacted into law on November 24, 1832 but 
despite widespread support for the sentiment, no other state legislature followed this lead. 
Another attempt to nullify federal law took place in 1855 when the Wisconsin’s Supreme 
Court ruled that the federal Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional. On appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the decision was reversed21, and the language of nullification, interposition 
and states’ rights was not heard again until it resurfaced following the 1954 decision of the 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education and the so-called Massive Resistance that 
ensued.22 Led by Virginia, eight states adopted nullification and interposition resolutions 
which borrowed directly from Calhoun.23 Arkansas went so far as to amend its constitution. 
In Texas a referendum “to invoke some form of interposition to halt federal encroachment 
                                                          
17 See THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., NULLFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 15 (2010); 
see also Ilaria Di-Gioia, When Liberty Subverts Federalism: Is Nullification of Federal Law Legitimate? 4 EDINBURGH STUDENT 
L. REV., 155-168 (2015); James H. Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and Undead: Nullification Past and Present, in Levinson 
ed., supra note 12, at 91; Robert S. Claiborne Jr,., Why Virginia’s Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Did Not Invoke Nullification,  46 U. RICH. L. REV. 917. 
18 Judith A.Hagley, Massive Resistance; The Rhetoric and the Reality, 27 N. M. L. REV. 167 (1997); Christopher R. Drahozal, 
The Supremacy Clause 46 (2004) (Nullification is the idea that states can declare federal laws unconstitutional, whereas 
interposition “is a more variable concept, sometimes synonymous with nullification, sometimes something less than 
nullification but more than mere protest.”)   
Interposition is not “categorical defiance by an individual state,” but interposition allows states to “seek support of 
other members of the compact [or other states].” Robert B. McKay, “With All Deliberate Speed”: A Study of School 
Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991, 1038 (1956). 
19 See Read & Allen, supra note 17, at 104-06 (referencing John Calhoun, James Kilpatrick , the strategist of southern 
opposition to  the Brown decision and Thomas E Woods Jr. of TAC). 
20 South Carolina legislature used Calhoun's reasoning to nullify the Tariff of 1832, which had earlier replaced the 
Tariff of Abominations. 
21  Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859).  
22 See Hagley, supra note 18. 
23 The timeline was as follows: Feb. 1, 1956: Virginia joint resolution; Feb. 2, 1956: Alabama House Joint Resolution; 
Feb. 14, 1956: South Carolina joint resolution; Feb. 29, 1956: Mississippi Senate Concurrent resolution no. 125, 
adopted; Apr. 18, 1956; Arkansas interposition Constitutional Amendment adopted. May 29, 1956: Louisiana 
interposition resolution, May 2, 1957: Florida interposition resolution. 
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on States’ rights” received an affirmative vote.24 The North Carolina legislature passed a 
“resolution of protest” against the Brown desegregation decision, having “defeated efforts 
to strengthen the resolution into one of interposition, and turned down a plan to soften its 
words”25 The Tennessee House of Representatives did adopt an interposition resolution, 
but the Senate did not ratify it.26 We consider the texts of these resolutions/constitutional 
amendments in more detail shortly. At this stage we note simply that in constitutional terms 
they could not survive the decision of the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron27 as was 
comprehensively explained by a three member federal court in Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. 
Bd.: “interposition is not a constitutional doctrine. If taken seriously, it is illegal defiance of 
constitutional authority.” 28 The Court addressed the compact theory directly: 
 
Interposition is an amorphous concept based on the proposition that the 
United States is a compact of states, any one of which may interpose its 
sovereignty against the enforcement within its borders of any decision of the 
Supreme Court or act of Congress, irrespective of the fact that the 
constitutionality of the act has been established by decision of the Supreme 
Court. Once interposed, the law or decision would then have to await approval 
by constitutional amendment before enforcement within the interposing state. 
In essence, the doctrine denies the constitutional obligation of the states to 
respect those decisions of the Supreme Court with which they do not agree. The 
doctrine may have had some validity under the Articles of Confederation. On 
their failure, however, ‘in Order to form a more perfect Union,’ the people, not 
the states, of this country ordained and established the Constitution. Thus the 
Keystone of the interposition thesis, that the United States is a compact of states, 
was disavowed in the Preamble to the Constitution. 29 
 
                                                          
24  TEXAS ALMANAC, 1958-1959, 451,455, available at 
https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth117139/m1/453/?q=interposition 
25  See SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Aug., 1956, available at 
http://crdl.usg.edu/export/html/gua/ssn/crdl_gua_ssn_ssnvol3no2.html?Welcome 
26 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 228-82; 481-83 (1957); 
27  358 U.S. 1, 17-18 :  
we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding 
in the Brown case. It is necessary only to recall some basic constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine. 
‘Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’ In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, 
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as ‘the fundamental and paramount law of the nation’, 
declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (2 L. Ed. 60), that ‘It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ This decision declared the basic principle that the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been 
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It 
follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the 
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ Every state legislator and executive and judicial 
officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, ‘to support this Constitution.” Cooper v. Aaron, 
supra. 
28 188 F.Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960). 
29 Id. at 922–23 (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 324, 14 U.S. 304, 324, 4 L.Ed. 97. 
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Ultimately, the question was one of authority: who, under the Constitution, should have 
the final say on questions of constitutionality. To this there could be only one answer; the 
Supreme Court of the United States rather than any statute authority is the ultimate judge 
of constitutionality. 30 Louisiana’s Interposition Act purporting to ‘interpose’ the 
sovereignty of state against enforcement of the Brown decision pending a change to the law 
of the land by proper constitutional amendment, was invalid, and the related package of 
segregation measures must fall with it.31 
As the Bush Court observed, “throughout the early history of this country, the standard 
of interposition was raised whenever a state strongly disapproved of some action of the 
central government.”32 It is claimable, as the Louisiana statute observed and contemporary 
proponents of nullification stress, that the doctrines have antecedents that are benign.33 
These claims notwithstanding, it is the Massive Resistance resolutions which followed the 
Brown II decision in May 195534 that cast the shadow of Jim Crow and it is to their texts 
that we now turn. 
Virginia's Interposition and Nullification Resolution, was typical of those that followed. 
It began with a “firm resolution to maintain and to defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and the Constitution of this State, against every attempt, whether foreign or 
domestic, to undermine the dual structure of this Union, and to destroy those fundamental 
principles embodied in our basic law, by which the delegated powers of the Federal 
government and the reserved powers of the respective States have long been protected and 
assured.” There then followed recitals of what have become the basic tenets of states’ rights 
arguments; ie  that the powers of the Federal Government result solely from the compact 
to which the States are parties; that its powers are limited by that compact to the enumerated 
powers; that all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people; and 
that the Supreme Court has no power to amend the Constitution.35 We then get to the crux 
of the matter. The power to operate separate schools being a power reserved to the States 
                                                          
30 Id, at 925. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 923. 
33 notably by Thomas E. Woods, Jr. of the Tenth Amendment Center: See THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., NULLIFICATION: 
HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 78-81 (2010). Woods refers to the case of Sherman Booth, 
found guilty by a federal court of violating the Fugitive Slave Act. The Wisconsin State Supreme Court ordered his 
release, declaring the Fugitive Slave Act to be unconstitutional but was firmly rebuked by the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1858): “No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party 
is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him, or to require him to be 
brought before them.” Woods goes on to quote the resolution of the Wisconsin State legislature to the effect that the 
action of the U.S. Supreme Court was “without authority, void and of no force”. Woods, id. at 8. Although the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court was the only state high court to declare the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional, jury 
nullification occurred when juries refused to convict persons who assisted fugitive slave, See Gary Collison “This Flagitious 
Offense”: Daniel Webster and the Shadrach Rescue Cases, 1851-1852. 68 NEW ENG. Q. 609 (1995). Legislative nullification 
occurred in Vermont, November 1850, when the state legislature passed a "Habeas Corpus Law," requiring Vermont 
judicial and law enforcement officials to assist captured fugitive slaves, in effect making the federal Fugitive Slave Act 
unenforceable in Vermont. 
34 Requiring that state school boards with federal court supervision dismantle their dual systems “with all deliberate 
speed”. 
35 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 445-47 (1956). 
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exercisable “without intervention of the Federal courts under the Federal Constitution” so 
that the Brown decision of May 17, 1954 “placed upon the Constitution an interpretation, 
having the effect of an amendment thereto, which interpretation Virginia emphatically 
disapproves,” the General Assembly of Virginia, “mindful of the resolution it adopted on 
December 21, 1798, ... again asserts this fundamental principle: That whenever the Federal 
Government attempts the deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of powers not granted it, 
the States who are parties to the compact have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose 
. . .).36  
 
Presciently for Sebelius and our purposes, Virginia then expresses concern about federal 
overreach:  
we have watched with growing concern as the power delegated to the Congress 
to regulate commerce among the several States has been stretched into a power 
to control local enterprises remote from interstate commerce; we have witnessed 
... the advancing tendency to read into a power to lay taxes for the general welfare 
a power to confiscate the earnings of our people for purposes unrelated to the 
general welfare as we conceive it; we have been dismayed at judicial decrees 
permitting private property to be taken for uses that plainly are not public uses; 
we are disturbed at the effort now afoot to distort the power to provide for the 
common defense, by some Fabian alchemy, into a power to build local 
schoolhouses37 
  
Finally, mirroring the Kentucky Resolution of 1798, Virginia appeals to her sister States 
and respectfully requests them to join her in taking appropriate steps, pursuant to settle, 
(by constitutional amendment) “the issue of contested power here asserted,” pending which 
she resolves, “to take all appropriate measures honorably, legally and constitutionally 
available to us, to resist this illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers.”38 
Virginia used the language of interposition; other states borrowed from Calhoun's 
opposition to the 1828 tariff statutes to declare the Brown decision “null, void and of no 
effect” (Alabama); “unconstitutional, invalid and of no lawful effect within . . . 
Mississippi.”(Mississippi); “null, void, and of no effect.” (Georgia,39 Florida40 Alabama41) 
or used the language of both e.g. Arkansas (“…the State of Arkansas shall take appropriate 
action  and pass laws opposing in every Constitutional manner the Un-Constitutional 
desegregation decisions…of the United States Supreme Court, including interposing the 
sovereignty of the state of Arkansas to the end of nullification of these and all deliberate, 
                                                          
36 Id. (emphasis added). We italicize the words “deliberate, palpable, and dangerous” to emphasise the borrowing of these 
terms from the Virginia Resolution of 1798. The same wording is present in the resolutions that came later. 
37 Id. at 447. 
38 Id. 
39 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 438 (1956). 
40 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 707 (1956). 
41 Id. at 437. 
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palpable, and dangerous invasions or encroachment upon rights and powers not delegated 
to the United States nor prohibited to the States by the Constitution of the United 
States….” 42  The legislature of Louisiana pulled its punches; its resolution “solemnly 
declare[d] the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States…to be in violation of 
the Constitution of the United States, and the State of Louisiana; and, We declare, further, 
our firm intention to take all appropriate measures honorably and constitutionally available 
to us, to void this illegal encroachment upon the rights of the several States…”43 
 Unlike Calhoun and South Carolina in 1828, the legislatures stopped short of threatening 
secession, but underpinning all their claims lie the premises of state sovereign rights and 
illegal federal overreach, that Brown was a “deliberate, palpable and dangerous attempt”44 to 
change the true intent and meaning” of the Constitution, and a state had both the right and 
duty to resist the Court's illegal amendment until the issue was settled by a valid 
constitutional amendment. We return now to twenty-first century state legislative activity 
which is not confined to the PPACA but extends across a spectrum of issues which has 
included decriminalizing the use of medical marijuana, and opposing implementation of the 
REAL ID Act of 2005 and federal gun control laws,45 but now spreads even wider to take 
on matters such as the surveillance state, the ‘militarization’ of the police and restrictions 
on the commercial production of hemp. We consider these matters shortly. For now we 
consider specifically federalism scholar John Dinan’s view that critics who connect these 
practices with those of southern states in the 1830s and 1950s misunderstand the 
contemporary nature of state sovereignty assertions and their potential as legitimate 
responses to federal government overreach. 46 
Scholars, he claims, have not fully appreciated the continued vitality of these sorts of 
assertions of state sovereignty in part because they have often misunderstood recent state 
challenges to federal law and what they aim to accomplish. Scholarly supporters and critics 
alike have been complicit in this misunderstanding, with critics understandably seeking to 
de-legitimize recent state measures by associating them with the repudiated doctrine of 
nullification, especially as practiced by southern states in the 1830’s and 1950’s, and some 
supporters equally willing to embrace the nullification label out of a desire to associate them 
with the Jeffersonian doctrine of nullification invoked in the 1790’s. However, when we 
undertake a close examination of these recent state sovereignty measures, it is evident that 
they partake of something short of, and other than, nullification.47 
                                                          
42 Arkansas Constitutional amendment – text available at 1 RACE REL L.  REP 116. 
See also Florida, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 707-08: a resolution to declare [the Brown decision] “to be null, void and of no 
effect; to declare that a contest f powers has arisen between the State of Florida and the Supreme Court of the United 
States; to invoke the doctrine of interposition; and for other purposes.” 
43 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 755 (1956). 
44 South Carolina Act of Feb. 14 1956, id. at 443;  Georgia House Resolution No. 185 1956 Legislative Session Georgia 
General Assembly; id. at 438; Alabama, id. at 437; Arkansas; Florida, id. at 708 
45  See, e.g. Tenth Amendment Center, 2015 State of the Nullification Movement Report, 
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/report/. 
46 Dinan, supra note 12, at 1666-67. 
47 Dinan, id. 
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We approach this claim with specific reference to opposition to the PPACA in 2014, a 
year in which the legislatures of 26 states considered in the region of 120 oppositional bills 
and 37 bills were signed into law in 10 states. Analysis of the content of the bills suggests a 
classification into three groups as follows: 
 
1. Bills declaring the PPACA and its core provision “the individual mandate” 
unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable within the state. These bills use the 
language of nullification and we term them “nullification bills properly so-called”.  
2. Bills establishing measures to prohibit state agencies or employees from 
implementing the individual mandate within the state. These bills presuppose the 
constitutionally respectable anti-commandeering doctrine, according to which the 
federal government cannot impose targeted, affirmative or coercive duties upon 
state legislators or executive officials. 48  They do not use the language of 
nullification but make declarations of state sovereignty and assertions of rights, 
freedoms and liabilities of citizens within the state, largely with the aim of 
establishing the groundwork for federal court challenges to the PPACA on 
constitutional grounds. 
3. Bills establishing authority to join an interstate compact for multiple states 
opposing federal regulation over health matters which are properly the province 
of the states. Except in so far as these bills typically include declarations of 
opposition or incompatibility of state law with federal law, as noted above, these 
bills are not relevant to this present discussion and are included here for 
completeness only.49  
4. Illustrative of bills of the first group is South Carolina Senate Bill n. 147/ 2013 
which declares that the ACA “is not authorized by the Constitution of the United 
States and violates its true meaning and intent as given by the Founders and 
Ratifiers, and is invalid in this State, is not recognized by this State, is specifically 
rejected by this State, and is null and void and of no effect in this State.”50 Most 
of the nullification bills have been proposed by Southern States, with Tennessee, 
Oklahoma and Georgia in the front line (respectively, 14, 12 and 10 bills). Despite 
the considerable number of introduced ACA nullification bills, none has been 
enacted in its original form. In many cases the bills did not even reach the 
discussion stage, in others the language had been moderated and the nullification 
bill transformed in a sovereignty declaration. Notable absents are Texas and 
Florida. Five of the states proposing nullification bills used to be part of the 
                                                          
48   See 
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Rejection_of_Unconstitutional_Federal_Actions_Amendment,_Proposition_122_(
2014); see also Matthew D. Adler, The Supreme Court's Federalism: Real or Imagined, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI, 158 (2001). 
49 See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
50 Section 38-71-2120. The bill, like many other similar nullification bills in other states, died in committee. 
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Confederacy and all the states proposing nullification bills are red, ie Republican, 
states. 
Illustrative of the second group is Arizona’s Proposition 122, approved on 4th November 
2014 general election ballot. The proposition amended Article 2, Section 3 of the Arizona 
Constitution to declare the ability of the state to “exercise its sovereign authority to restrict 
the actions of its personnel and the use of its financial resources to purposes that are 
consistent with the Constitution” and that “this state and all political subdivisions of this 
state are prohibited from using any personnel or financial resources to enforce, administer 
or cooperate with the designated federal action or program.” 
Type 3 bills included for taxonomy purposes only, we now focus specifically on types 1 
and 2 and observe in relation to the former that while 23 states have considered bills seeking 
to nullify the legal validity of the PPACA, none of the bills have become law in their original 
form. The experience of North Dakota, is instructive here. S. 2309 S. in its original form 
provided that:  
1. (...) the federal laws known as (PPACA) ... are not authorized by the United 
States Constitution and violate its true meaning and intent as given by the 
founders and ratifiers and are declared to be invalid in this state, may not be 
recognized by this state, are specifically rejected by this state, and are considered 
to be null in this state. 
2. The legislative assembly shall enact any measure necessary to prevent the 
enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 within this state. 
3. Any official, agent, or employee of the United States government or any 
employee of a corporation providing services to the United States government 
who enforces or attempts to enforce an act, order, law, statute, rule, or regulation 
of the government of the United States in violation of this Act is guilty of a class 
C felony. 
4. Any public officer or employee of this state who enforces or attempts to 
enforce an act, order, law, statute, rule, or regulation of the government of the 
United States in violation of this Act is guilty of a class A misdemeanor .51 
 
By the time the provision reached the statute book, the language had been significantly 
toned down and the criminal penalty removed. The current version now declares more 
temperately:  
 
1. ... the federal laws known as (PPACA) ... likely are not authorized by the United 
States Constitution and may violate its true meaning and intent as given by the 
founders and ratifiers. 
 
                                                          
51 S.B. 2309, Leg.62d Sess. (N.D. 2011). 
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2. The legislative assembly shall consider enacting any measure necessary to 
prevent the enforcement of the (PPCA). 
 
3. No provision of the (PPCA) may interfere with an individual's choice of a 
medical or insurance provider except as otherwise provided by the laws of this 
state. 52 
 
The first draft replicated the first model nullification bill published by the Tenth 
Amendment Center (TAC), referred to earlier, but was toned down in committee in order 
to respond to objections that the language of nullification was constitutionally discredited.53 
For similar reasons it is generally type 2 bills modelled on the American Legislative 
Exchange Council's (ALEC) model "Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act," which have 
received statehouse success. Promoted by ALEC as "How Your State Can Block Single-
Payer and Protect Patients' Rights," these now called healthcare freedom bills gathered 
considerable state legislative interest during the period 2009-2012 and their language 
mirrors Arizona Proposition 101, which was narrowly defeated in 2008 but passed on the 
November 2010 ballot. The wording of the Idaho Health Freedom Act, enacted March 17, 
2010 (before the PPACA passed into law) is typical:  
 
(1) The power to require or regulate a person's choice in the mode of securing 
health care services, or to impose a penalty related thereto, is not found in the 
Constitution of the United States of America, and is therefore a power reserved 
to the people pursuant to the Ninth Amendment, and to the several states 
pursuant to the Tenth Amendment. The state of Idaho hereby exercises its 
sovereign power to declare the public policy of the state of Idaho regarding the 
right of all persons residing in the state of Idaho in choosing the mode of 
securing health care services free from the imposition of penalties, or the threat 
thereof, by the federal government of the United States of America relating 
thereto. 
 
(2) It is hereby declared that ... every person within the state of Idaho is and 
shall be free to choose or decline to choose any mode of securing health care 
services without penalty or threat of penalty by the federal government of the 
United States of America.54  
 
                                                          
52 S.B. 2309,  Leg.62d Sess. (N.D. 2011) (emphasis added) (original draft available at www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/62-
2011/documents/11-0742-02000.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). 
53 See Senate Standing Committee Minutes, Conference Committee Apr.  18, 2011. On 4/18/2011 Rep. Kasper 
explained that although in his personal opinion the ACA was not authorized by the U.S. Constitution the words “likely” 
and “may” were necessary for the survival of the bill: “[I] would agree but sometimes making those bold statements at 
a time like this might not be the right thing to say for the survival of the bill”.  Rep. Ruby emphasized that a softer 
language would have left room for some kind of result at higher court level. 
54 I.C. § 39-9003 (2010). 
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TAC which promotes itself as “the nation’s leading source for constitutional education 
and nullification activism” no longer promotes bills which directly confront the Supremacy 
Clause. Instead their model “nullification bill” is called an “anti-commandeering bill” and, 
after reciting the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of state powers and federal PPACA 
overreach which “makes a mockery of James Madison’s assurance in Federalist #45 that 
the “powers delegated” to the Federal Government are “few and defined”, while those of 
the States are “numerous and indefinite,” prohibits state agencies employees or contractors, 
subject to civil penalties, from  
 
 1) Enforc[ing] any federal act, law, order, rule or regulation of the federal 
government of the United States designed to give effect to the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, signed by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. 
(2) Provid[ing] material support, participation or assistance in any form, with 
any federal agency or employee engaged in the enforcement of any federal act, 
law, order, rule, or regulation of the federal government of the United States 
designed to give effect to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
(3) Utiliz[ing] any assets, state funds or funds allocated by the state to local 
entities on or after (DATE), in whole or in part, to engage in any activity that 
aids a federal agency, federal agent, or corporation providing services to the 
federal government in the enforcement of any federal act, law, order, rule, or 
regulation of the federal government of the United States designed to give effect 
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.55 
 
What are we to make of this and specifically of John Dinan’s argument that what we see 
here represents the mechanics of federalism at work? The first point is this. Dinan’s claim 
was made specifically in relation to state legislative bills legalizing medical marijuana and 
opposing implementation of the REAL ID Act (requiring state-issued driving licences to 
conform to uniform federal standards).56 These bills, he argues, do not invoke nullification 
which he describes as a “discredited doctrine inconsistent with the constitutional principles 
underlying the American federal system.”57 Instead they should properly be regarded as 
mechanisms by which states can “talk back” to Washington when the federal government 
puts in place regulations and directives fixing states with fiscal or administrative burdens 
without paying sufficient attention or conceding sufficient respect to state reservations or 
concerns. 58  In other words, they are a legitimate tool of effective state response to 
perceptions of federal overreach.  
Although this paper has focused on state legislative opposition to PPACA, it is certainly 
the case that this fits into a pattern of expanding areas of state concern that is now finding 
                                                          
55 http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/legislation/obamacare/. 
56 See also John Dinan, How States Talk Back to Washington and Strengthen American Federalism, 744 POLICY ANALYSIS (Dec 
3, 2013). 
57 Id. at 2 
58 Id. 
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expression with similar tactics. 59  TAC now lists as targets for its self-designated 
“nullification bills” the following areas of state concern in descending order of priority: the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (controlling access to experimental drugs), 60 the 
mechanisms of the “surveillance state,”(specifically the use of drones, ALPRs and 
stingrays), federal restrictions on the commercial production of hemp, federal gun control 
regulations federal funding of military grade weaponry for local police, and the legalization 
of marijuana for personal use. Opposition to “Obamacare” now occupies seventh place 
listed with ‘other issues’ including “Sound Money” – ie state gold and silver backed currency 
competition with Federal Reserve notes and opposition to Common Core educational 
standards. ALEC which earlier promoted “Healthcare Freedom Bills” and now anticipates 
its repeal under a Trump regime has removed these from its web-site.  
The second point concerns the ‘anti-commandeering’ doctrine announced by the 
Supreme Court in Printz v. United States to the effect that Congress cannot compel the States 
to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. 61  It is clear, as we saw earlier, that 
nullification bills properly so-called are unlikely to be successful in state legislatures.TAC 
now calls its bills “anti-commandeering” and equates this with “nullification” on the 
grounds that in practical terms what is important is the actual effect.62 Since as they claim, 
most federal acts or programs require a federal/state partnership to actually carry them out, 
bills that ban state participation can make those acts or programs “nearly impossible” to 
enforce; in effect, if not in law, the result is nullification. 63 Nullification in this sense 
becomes a practice not an ideology so that, as both Dinan and TAC claim, the link with 
Massive Resistance and the legacy of Calhoun is misplaced. 
The third point follows. Printz itself involved a challenge to provisions in the federal Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring local chief law enforcement officers to check 
the backgrounds of prospective purchasers of handguns pending the establishment of a 
national system. Holding this provision to be unconstitutional, Justice Scalia, for the 
majority, wrote: 
Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the 
States’ officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the 
States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their 
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not 
whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits 
is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty.64 
                                                          
59 See text accompanying  note 45 supra. 
60 Tenth Amendment Center, 2015 State of the Nullification Movement: Report on the Growth of State-Level 
Resistance to Federal Power, http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/report/. 
61 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
62 http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/legislation/obamacare/. 
63 Tenth Amendment Center, supra note 60. 
64 521 U.S. at 935 (emphasis added).. 
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Here, we argue, lies the rub. Justice Scalia claims that a system of “dual sovereignty” in 
U.S. constitutional arrangements is “incontestable”65 but as Professors Read and Allen 
suggest, the absence of the words “sovereign” and “sovereignty” from the Constitution 
supports a strong inference that “those who framed, ratified and amended the document 
did not agree among themselves about what sovereignty was and where in the Constitution 
it was found.” 66 Justice Scalia looked to “historical understanding and practice in the 
structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court” for the answer. 67 In 
terms of the first, as this paper details and President Obama understood, the language of 
state sovereignty is tainted by the practice of the past and this may likely be irredeemable.68 
A study of the last is beyond the present scope of this paper. That leaves the structure of 
the Constitution and Professor Dinan’s claim that states are working within the vertical 
separation of powers to exploit the constitutional options open to them for combatting 
federal government overreach.  
In a recent article in Prospect, Adam Tomkins has argued that federalism U.S. style is 
“dying”,69 distorted by a twenty-first century power imbalance in favour of the federal 
government that now leaves little for the states to do:   
The reach of American government into not only the economy but social policy continued 
to grow, not shrink. From abortion to gay marriage, from Obamacare to the American 
government’s controversial “no child left behind” and “every student succeeds” education 
policies, there is less and less for the states to do. Arizona cannot control its long border 
with Mexico even when the immigration controls it enacts are held to be consistent with 
federal law: it is pre-empted from doing so by the fact that Congress has “occupied the 
field.”70 
From this perspective it is not just the language of state sovereignty but the concept itself 
that is outdated to the point of irrelevance. When, as he suggest, “some influential American 
policy-makers think now that states are little more than a relic from the past, and that it is 
clusters of cities and city-regions that are the economic powerhouses” the “live questions 
in American politics” now are: “can the states survive? And can they survive with anything 
meaningful to do?”71 
This is itself an ideological view. The “liberal Yale law professors” that Tomkins refers to, 
share with the avowedly ideological TAC, the understanding that as Professor Heather 
Gerken explains:  
[t]he federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with 
immigration, enforce its own drug laws, carry out its environmental policies, 
build its own infrastructure, or administer its health care system. Instead, it relies 
                                                          
65 Id. at 919. 
66  Read & Allen, supra note 11, at 99. 
67 521 U.S. at 905. 
68 See text accompanying note 13 supra. 
69 Adam Tomkins, British American and European Politics: Federal Flaw, PROSPECT Oct. 2016. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements between the 
states and federal government “cooperative federalism.” But we forget that they 
create many opportunities for what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have called 
“uncooperative federalism”.72 
 
From this point of view the resources and enforcement mechanisms of state regulatory 
apparatus are far from irrelevant but as Professor Gerken’s colleague points out, in a 
context of polarized political partisanship, federalism and states’ rights of themselves have 
no valence. Whether state legislative opposition to the PPACA has a legitimate place as an 
appropriate tactic of contemporary federalism is a profoundly ideological question: 
“without an appreciation of partisanship’s influence, dynamics considered fundamental to 
our federal system are obscure.” 73  The PPACA was the signature achievement of a 
Democratic president and state opposition was partisan from day one; no Republican 
supported its passage and no Democratic state officials joined the multi-state legal 
challenge. As we stand at the beginning of a Trump presidency and progressives fear the 
worst for the future not only of the PPACA but even more profoundly for what might be 
termed an equality agenda, can we expect the language of states’ rights with its associated 
tactics of nullification and interposition to be deployed for a liberal agenda? 
Nullification theory, write Professors Read and Allen gains traction not from it being good 
constitutional theory but from the mere fact that it is a constitutional theory- one addressed 
to nonjudicial actors in language they understand, within a political community founded on 
the premise that the Constitution ultimately expresses the will of the people. Those who 
use constitutional arguments, even weak ones, have an advantage over those who neglect 
constitutional arguments altogether. Contemporary nullification theory thrives in this 
vacuum.74 
As Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken point out, traditional states’ rights arguments 
fit a model of federalism in which autonomous states rival the federal government from a 
position of outsider.75 The alternative model of “co-operative federalism” allocates to the 
states only a subservient role as “supportive insiders--servants and allies to the federal 
government” with, as Bulman-Pozen and Gerken put it, no “fully developed account of the 
ways in which states playing the role of federal servant can also resist federal mandates, the 
ways in which integration--and not just autonomy--can empower states to challenge federal 
authority”76 If the negative connotations of state challenges to federal authority are to be 
discarded, what is needed is new constitutional theorising with a new conceptual framework 
and vocabulary that can not only accommodate but accord value to challenge, dissent and 
                                                          
72 Heather Gerken, We’re About to See States’ Rights Used Aggressively Against Trump, http://www.vox.com/the-
big-idea/2016/12/12/13915990/federalism-trump-progressive-uncooperative, Dec 12, 2016, 8:50am EST  (referring 
to Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009). 
 
73 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2014). 
74 Read & Allen, supra note 16, at 124. 
75 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009). 
76 Id. at 1264. 
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even resistance at state-level. Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s “uncooperative federalism” 
which celebrates state strength at the heart of the federal regulatory state offers just such a 
model, not least because of their “counter-intuitive” conclusions concerning current 
Supreme Court federalism doctrine:  
In our view, a strong commitment to uncooperative federalism would lead you to 
conclude that the Supreme Court has two central doctrines of federalism backwards. Rather 
than proscribe commandeering and expansively construe preemption as it does now, a 
Court attentive to uncooperative federalism should allow commandeering and cabin 
preemption. By fostering integration and overlap in regulatory spheres, this doctrinal 180 
would facilitate state dissent while pushing federal engagement with state challenges.77 
Given the current political balance on the Supreme Court and the likely impact of future 
presidential nominees, we are tempted to say that at the present time, this is for the birds. 
We return therefore to the point where we began this paper and President Obama’s 
observations concerning the negative history of states’ rights arguments. This history 
needed to be addressed, he continued, “so that [opponents] understand if I am concerned 
about leaving it up to states to expand Medicaid that it may not simply be because I am this 
power-hungry guy in Washington who wants to crush states’ rights but, rather, because we 
are one country and I think it is going to be important for the entire country to make sure 
that poor folks in Mississippi and not just Massachusetts are healthy”78 
The point is exactly that. Current state legislative oppositional activity may be in 
constitutional terms no more “than a protest, an escape valve through which the legislators 
blew off steam to relieve their tensions”79 but political though these strategies may be, as 
Professor Jost puts it: “health care reform is only about politics, except insofar as it is still 
about the morality of equal treatment for all.” 80 The onus is on those who now find 
themselves in opposition to make that case.  
 
 
  
 
                                                          
77 Id. at 1295. 
78 Obama, supra note 13 
79 Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (1960) (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. Educ., 62 
F.Supp. 372, 381(N.D. Ala., 1958).  
80 Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Care Reform?, 362 N. ENG. J. MED. 869-871 (2010).  
